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Abstract  2 
Judgment and decision making in sporting officials is a challenging task that involves 3 
the use of context. Although process models of decision making describe decision 4 
contexts, none of the existing models explains when sports officials use rule-driven 5 
decision making, or game management. The basic idea of our work is that referees use 6 
a subjective threshold to apply game management, which may explain this decision 7 
behavior. We propose a new dynamic threshold model that is based on concepts 8 
derived from Decision Field Theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993). The model 9 
includes two thresholds of game management (high/low) and two  contact situations 10 
(foul/no foul) as approaching one of these thresholds. Using the example of soccer 11 
refereeing, we argue that if the  game hits a subjective threshold of aggressive play, 12 
then the referee shifts from  applying the rules to managing the game. This new 13 
approach changes the scientific discussion from one focused on what referees should 14 
decide in one situation or the other, to a dynamic model that explains the basic 15 
psychological mechanism underlying the referee’s change in behavior during the 16 
game, both at the intra-individual as well as inter-individual level. 17 
 18 
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Introduction 1 
It is generally acknowledged that decision making in sport is complex. Within 2 
this domain, the decision making of officials is particularly complex, due to the need 3 
to account for the effects of context and given the uncertainty of the choices in many 4 
ambiguous situations (Pina et al., 2019; Slack et al., 2013). Officials (judges, referees, 5 
umpires) are involved in almost every competitive sport. Depending on the sport, 6 
judgments are made using different methods for the evaluation of performance and 7 
winners (Stefani, 1998), including objective measurements (e.g., a stopwatch in 8 
swimming), objective scores (e.g., the number of goals scored), and subjective 9 
judgments (e.g., points awarded to athletes for the aesthetics and difficulty of their 10 
performance). In many sports, officials are required to make decisions under time 11 
pressure in a dynamic environment (MacMahon et al., 2014 for an overview). The 12 
complex task of officiating has been classified based on the amount of interaction 13 
with athletes, and the number of cues processed, resulting in broad categories of  14 
fficials as either “interactors”, “monitors” or “reactors” (Plessner & MacMahon, 15 
2013). Choices for interactor officials such as soccer and basketball referees are 16 
arguably more influenced by context and interpretation compared to monitors such as 17 
gymnastics judges and reactors such as linesmen in tennis. We focus here on 18 
interactor referees that act in ball games, an accepted and frequently used 19 
classification of sport (Carron & Hausenblas, 1998) that is also applied to work 20 
focused on referees (Blas et al., 2020).  21 
Statistics from the Euro 2000 Championship show that soccer referees made 22 
approximately 137 observable decisions per game, with about 44 made by the head 23 
referee alone (Helsen & Bultynck, 2004). Besides these decisions, there are also about 24 
60 non-observable decisions (not strict fouls), when a referee decides not to interfere 25 
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with play, and therefore does not make a call (Helsen & Bultynck, 2004). Given an 1 
effective playing time of approximately 51 min, a top-class referee makes 3-4 2 
decisions per minute (Helsen & Bultynck, 2004). In terms of perceptual-cognitive 3 
demands, this is a huge workload. Neville, Salmon, and Read (2016) also show that in 4 
an average Australian Rules football game, there are 6,025 communication instances, 5 
and 887 moments when an umpire must decide to intervene in the game. 6 
Communication in this work was coded as those from umpires to players, but also 7 
between the umpiring team, indicating this is another significant demand and 8 
component of officiating. 9 
The problem we want to address   10 
The problem we want to address is to explain how referees actually shift from 11 
rules to game management during game play. In essence, the decisions of referees 12 
while officiating games reflect a choice between the enforcement of the laws (i.e., to 13 
be accurate; Plessner & Betsch, 2001) and game management (i.e., to be adequate, to 14 
ensure the flow of the game; Brand & Neß, 2004; Brand, Schmidt, & Schneeloch, 15 
2006; Mascarenhas, Collins, & Mortimer, 2002; Unkelbach & Memmert, 2008). More 16 
specifically, the concept of game management is a diverse concept that includes, for 17 
instance, effective communication, and establishing players’ respect beyond the 18 
decision-making component we focus on (e.g. Gomez, Ortega & Jones, 2016; Morris 19 
& O’Connor, 2017; Pina et al. 2019, Slack et al., 2013 for examples in rugby and 20 
soccer). Within the description of choices and their subcategories, interviews with 21 
referees revealed that, for instance “accuracy” of big decisions, consistency of 22 
decisions during a game, and correctly applying the "Laws of the Game" have been 23 
classified as game management (e.g. Slack et al., 2013, Figure 1, p. 304). In specific 24 
situations those choices have been described as trade-off decisions, which some refer 25 
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to  as a dilemma. For instance, Praschinger et al. (2011) define the dilemma as 1 
follows: 2 
“Clearly, we are faced with a dilemma. On one hand, we have the Laws of the 3 
Game which referees are supposed to follow to the letter. On the other hand, we have 4 
a highly complex and dynamic situation (a soccer match). Referees seem to solve this 5 
dilemma by applying game management. They balance their decisions by being 6 
sensitive to various influences (e.g., the minute of play). Game management appears 7 
to be a necessary prerequisite for applying the written Laws of the Game to specific 8 
situations during a match.” (p. 344). 9 
 10 
Whether this choice between applying the rules of the game and using 11 
judgment (game management) can be conceptualized as a dilemma can be discussed. 12 
In some experiments, situations have been created to present a choice between either 13 
enforcing the law or game management (e.g. Plessner & Betsch, 2001). In other 14 
descriptions, game management adds a communication strategy to the enforcement of 15 
the law and cannot be conceptualized as a dilemma (Slack et al., 2013). Neither 16 
enforcing the law nor using game management are good or bad per se. Thus, we argue 17 
that a sanction can be evaluated based on the challenge in ambiguous situations to 18 
either sanction violations by a call or keep the flow of the game by not calling this 19 
violation.  20 
MacMahon and Mildenhall (2012) illustrate the problem of how to decide 21 
what decision approach to use in ambiguous situations. They provide an  extreme 22 
example of a basketball referee's choice to make a clearly inaccurate call (an 23 
unwarranted foul after a player's simulation), to manage a volatile home crowd in a 24 
game with a lopsided score. This choice reflects management of the situation in which 25 
the specific call was judged as one which would not adversely affect the outcome. The 26 
example clearly illustrates that the referee overwrote application of the rules in favor 27 
of game management. While this is an extreme example, and a rare occurrence, 28 
Kolbinger and Stöckl (2019) provide evidence of regularly occurring rule violations in 29 
Running head: A threshold process model of refereeing 
 6 
soccer, wherein a trivial offense is perceived by the official, but not enforced. 1 
Specifically, they showed that in 96.3% of the 618 penalty kicks assessed from games 2 
in four European leagues and one cup event, the referee did not call rule violations. 3 
Similarly, referees are often encouraged to apply a preventive refereeing approach 4 
(Mascarenhas, Collins, & Mortimer, 2015) – which is a form of game management – 5 
expressively verbalizing to players and warning them about the potential of their 6 
actions (e.g., "number three, get onside…") to prevent fouls from occurring and 7 
maintain the flow of the game. Obviously, referees cannot predict the future 8 
consequences of their decisions, in terms of control or lack of control over what 9 
happens on the field following one decision or the other; however, their early 10 
decisions within the context of game management do have an impact. For example, 11 
the first yellow card in the game between Cameroon and Germany during the World 12 
Cup match in 2002 was awarded against Cameroon's midfielder Marc Vivien Foé in 13 
the eighth minute. Starting with a yellow card early in the game, the referees, we can 14 
speculate, felt the need to be consistent; at the end of the game, there was a record of 15 
13 additional yellow cards awarded (MacMahon et al., 2015). This case illustrates the 16 
consequence of using consistency and more strictly using rule application. 17 
How is the choice of interactor referees currently explained or approached? 18 
About two decades ago the challenge of law enforcement and game 19 
management was discussed in the literature as refereeing being either a craft or an art. 20 
For instance, Mascarenhas, Collins, and Mortimer (2002) and Plessner and Betsch 21 
(2001) debated whether soccer referees use compensation strategies. In the specific 22 
case, referees in experiments showed that if they have given a foul for one team that 23 
results in a penalty, there is a lower likelihood that they will give the same team 24 
another penalty when faced with an ambiguous situation. Rather, the likelihood of 25 
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giving a penalty to the other team was higher, with penalties balancing out between 1 
the teams. The conclusion of the studies, the debate, and the rejoinder highlighted that 2 
this is indeed a challenge to be addressed: within a game, referees are constantly faced 3 
with what guiding principle to use in their decision making – rule application, or game 4 
management. Although Brand, Schmidt, and Schneeloch (2006) also provided some 5 
laboratory-based empirical evidence for game management as a guiding principle for 6 
decision making, 20 years later this discussion has not yet been further or 7 
systematically developed to testable predictions or specific recommendations for 8 
referees in training or performance. While research on different factors that influence 9 
decisions and decision phenomena have been conducted (e.g., gymnastics' country; 10 
Damisch, Mussweiler, & Plessner, 2006), they do not explicitly address this 11 
challenge.  12 
From the current interviews and task classifications that have been published, 13 
the complexity of referee decision making including multiple dimensions of game 14 
management are self-reported, observed ,or experimentally studied (MacMahon et al., 15 
2015 for a summary). Our focus on choices will allow operationalization of the 16 
challenge using the illustration of a situation that is less ambiguous than a dynamic 17 
foul situation: Cursing by soccer players. According to Law 12 of the game 18 
(Fédération International de Football Association) a player is to be expelled from the 19 
game by a red card for using assaulting language or gestures. Praschinger et al. 20 
(2011), asking 113 referees, showed that the sanction varied dramatically between 21 
referees and depended on content of the swear word. For instance, if the insulting 22 
content of the swear word was attributed to the appearance of the referee about 33% 23 
decided on a red card whereas about 74% when the content pertained to sexual 24 
orientation. In the appearance content, 31% of the referees decided for a yellow card, 25 
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20% for admonition (verbal warning) and about 12% for ‘no reaction’,  illustrating the 1 
large amount of individual differences in the choice. Thus, our position is that we 2 
need to understand how referees solve the challenge between the enforcement of rules 3 
and game management to allow better and accepted decisions to develop. The current 4 
research in this area is primarily descriptive in nature, as illustrated by two current 5 
conceptualizations. 6 
First, the concept of accurate-adequate decisions in refereeing (Brand, 7 
Plessner, & Schweizer, 2009) argued that, in essence, referees' choices can be 8 
described as a tradeoff between accurate and adequate decision making. It is not 9 
always clear, however, which of these two is the better option, or what drives the 10 
choice (Schweizer & Plessner, 2016). Accurate decisions are made when a referee can 11 
categorize whether an incident was a foul or not according to the criteria in the laws 12 
of the game. Adequate decisions consider the dynamics of the respective game. Thus, 13 
in officiating games adequately referees should adjust their judgment of each single 14 
contact foul (foul/no foul) to the concrete context of the ongoing situation. The 15 
accuracy-adequacy model assumes that accuracy is a necessary requirement for 16 
making adequate decisions. Still, sport associations (e.g., IFAB – International 17 
Football Association Board) do not expect referees to achieve 100 percent accuracy in 18 
decisions for every single incident, but rather to avoid clearly incorrect decisions that 19 
might influence the outcome of the game ("game-changing" situations), such as in 20 
soccer goals, penalty decisions and direct red card incidents (Helsen, MacMahon, & 21 
Spitz, 2019).  22 
A second modeling proposes that accurate-adequate choices are in fact the use of 23 
Type-1 versus Type-2 decisions in refereeing (Helsen, MacMahon, & Spitz, 2019). 24 
Type-1 refers to rapid and intuitive decisions and Type-2 decisions are more 25 
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deliberate ones that are used in addition to Type-1 game management type of 1 
decisions. In other words, deliberate and slower processing is triggered when 2 
contextual cues (e.g., prior decisions) cast doubts on the initially triggered decisions 3 
(Helsen, MacMahon, & Spitz, 2019). Biases can occur in high-conflict situations 4 
(e.g., second yellow card). The rationale of this model refers to the theoretical view 5 
that human judgment and decision making is assumed to arise from the interaction of 6 
two different systems of reasoning. Kahneman and Frederick (2002) simply labeled 7 
these Type-1 and Type-2 choices coming from "system 1" and "system 2", but other 8 
descriptions for the dual process of thinking were proposed, including impulsive 9 
versus reflective (Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Strack, Werth, & Deutsch, 2006), 10 
symbolic versus associative (Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000), and 11 
intuitive/affective versus rational/deliberative system. System 1 is assumed to be 12 
emotional, automatic, fast, and implicit, whereas system 2 is often described as 13 
controlled, slow, and explicit (Kahneman, 2011). We can illustrate the pros and cons 14 
of applying a very specific dual-process model to referee decisions. Evans’ (2008) 15 
default-interventionist dual process model (DIDPM) assumes a specific and sequential 16 
interaction of heuristic and deliberative thinking such that a referee first uses a default 17 
process of intuitive thinking to decide on a foul or not. Before the referee whistles, 18 
however, a second and sequential analytical process may or may not intervene and 19 
thus the name default-interventionist model. The DIDPM could explain referee 20 
choices, but would ignore both context effects of the previous decisions that may 21 
influence the current one, and  how other cues about the development of aggressive 22 
behavior in general influence the choice. Finally, DIDPM ignores individual 23 
differences. In contrast, we use individual differences as model parameters to 24 
understand the different behaviors in referees even though dual-process models in 25 
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principle are able to model multiple interactions of dual-processes, individual 1 
differences, and context effects (e.g., Raab, 2015; Furley, Schweitzer, & Bertram, 2 
2015, for applications to athletes’ decisions). On a more critical note, it has been 3 
argued that, given the limits of the current dual-process models (Melnikov & Bargh, 4 
2018), we can do better in modeling individual differences (Boogaart et al., 2018) and 5 
explaining action control in general (Hommel, 2019). Theoretical predictions for a 6 
DFT and a DIDPM model in the future could be empirically tested but are out of the 7 
realm of the theoretical positions presented here. 8 
Both descriptions of the trade-off in showing accurate and adequate decisions 9 
restate the problem in different words but do not explain the decision process to shift 10 
from an accurate decision to an adequate one or from type 1 to type 2. Further, both 11 
descriptions do not allow any prediction of when each guiding principle is used or 12 
when switches take place. Finally, neither description is sensitive to intra- or 13 
interindividual differences that would help to personalize and specify the selection 14 
and development of referees.  15 
Given the silence in science on explaining the game management-rule 16 
application, accurate-adequate trade-off in refereeing decisions is the rationale for 17 
developing a testable model. From the above current state of research it seems evident 18 
that there are three issues the model needs to address. First, the model should describe 19 
the processes of game management and rule application and how choices could be 20 
explained. Second, the model should be able to predict when switches occur in the 21 
dynamics of a developing game and show violations of predictions and alternative 22 
causes driving choices. Third, the model should be sensitive to inter- and 23 
intraindividual differences to develop a personalized and context-specific diagnostic 24 
and intervention profile for referees. Our intention, then, is to provide a model which 25 
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can serve these purposes: explain the process, predict behavior (and identify when 1 
each behavior is preferable), and provide guidance for training. A test of our model 2 
can be envisioned in empirical studies and we will provide a sample of these at the 3 
end of the paper (in Table 1). Further, the model should be able to demonstrate how 4 
diagnostics and interventions should be developed, testing better choices against 5 
existing typical training of referees. 6 
The threshold model of refereeing 7 
Basic assumptions 8 
Context matters 9 
The primary goal of the proposed model around the challenge between game 10 
management versus rule application is to improve the referees' decisions. The function 11 
of the model is therefore to provide a practical impact to the field for training and 12 
selection of referees. An empirical validation of the model is a future goal that will be 13 
described in the discussion. A basic assumption of the model is the need to understand 14 
the referees within their environment and its dynamics. Thus, context matters. The 15 
necessity of accounting for context in a decision model for refereeing is underscored 16 
by the research evidence that decisions change according to context. For example, 17 
consider research in referees showing compensation mechanisms, wherein previous 18 
decisions may bias a decision in favor of the opponent team (Plessner & Betsch, 19 
2001). Similarly, we can consider effects in refereeing that produce biased decisions 20 
in favor of the home-team (Boyko, Boyko, & Boyko, 2007; Poolton, Siu, & Masters, 21 
2011), the effect of reputation of a player or team (Jones, Paull, & Erskine, 2002), and 22 
moment-to-moment game encounters (Unkelbach & Memmert, 2008). Perhaps not 23 
surprisingly, therefore, high-level decision making has also highlighted the effects of 24 
the specific time or score (e.g., pitch counts in baseball; MacMahon & Starkes, 2008).  25 
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Framing decisions in different contexts such as searching for similarity or 1 
contrast also changes decisions (Damisch, Mussweiler, & Plessner, 2006). Evidence 2 
for the effect of context was also found in an experiment by Brand, Schmidt, and 3 
Schneeloch (2006) with elite basketball referees, showing that the referees decided on 4 
less rigorous sanctions when video clips were presented to them chronologically as 5 
was in the game (sequential context) compared to a randomized order. Further, the 6 
context of the home crowd behavior was suggested to explain the increase in yellow 7 
cards awarded by the referees to the away teams after the introduction of the video 8 
system (TMO) in rugby (Dawson, Massey, & Downward, 2019). The TMO is argued 9 
to be less influenced by crowed behavior however, rather ironically, it appears to 10 
contribute to the previously documented home advantage (e.g., Nevill, Balmer, & 11 
Williams, 2002; Nevill et al., 2017). It is clear, from the evidence, that referee 12 
decision processes are inextricably linked to the complex and multifaceted context in 13 
which they take place – and thus context is an essential component of any decision 14 
model. 15 
Individual differences matter  16 
The above-described effects in refereeing have provided evidence that context 17 
matters in referee choices and thus it seems valid to consider context in any model 18 
that explains shifts from accurate to adequate decisions. The example of the referee 19 
giving 13 more yellow cards after an early yellow card illustrates the use of context, 20 
but this context was driven by the choice to remain consistent in events that followed 21 
of a similar nature. However, consistency cannot account for many of the effects 22 
described above, or for the situation of the basketball referee who responded to the 23 
crowd by violating consistency in favor of deregulating the current aggressive 24 
atmosphere (MacMahon & Mildenhall, 2012). Consistency also does not account for 25 
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the minor rule violations, which sometimes are ignored by the referees, as shown in 1 
the data of Kolbinger and Stöckl (2019). Our model can be considered a context 2 
model in a broader sense that includes the time scale ranges over games or specific 3 
short events within a game that allow a shift from accurate to adequate decisions. 4 
Moreover, it also considers individual differences in referees for rule application. For 5 
example, we might compare two soccer referees, R1 and R2. Each of the referees has a 6 
subjective threshold level (high/low) for applying game management. R1 is considered 7 
more of a ‘law enforcer’ referee (Praschinger et al., 2011), and R2 is ‘game manager’ 8 
(Praschinger et al., 2011). A model of decision processes and shifts from rule 9 
administration to game management needs to consider these individuals. 10 
Considering these basic assumptions of context and individuals, there are key 11 
components of the model as described below.  12 
Basic description of the threshold model  13 
The difference between referees R1 (law enforcer) and R2 (game manager), 14 
and the fact that they have different thresholds for when they will use game 15 
management, is a key component of the model, hence we call this a threshold model. 16 
Thresholds in general decision making are a well-established concept that illustrates 17 
that we stop to search for information when a specific threshold is met. Thresholds 18 
can vary subjectively by the needs of an individual person to gain information before 19 
making a choice and are defined by the situation in which a decision needs to be 20 
somewhat fast and the person has limited resources for making a choice. In our use of 21 
thresholds, individual referees may always strive to make accurate decisions, 22 
however, acknowledge the need to apply game management, similar to the scenario 23 
described above (MacMahon & Mildenhall, 2012). Each individual may have a 24 
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different level for how much change of context (e.g., change to higher level of 1 
aggression) prompts an increase in game management behaviors.  2 
A classical model that assumes choices are made when a threshold is met is 3 
the decision field theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993). Decision field theory 4 
(DFT) is a dynamic-cognitive approach to human choice behavior. The model 5 
describes how a person's preferences evolve across time until a decision is reached. 6 
The model is used to predict how humans make decisions under uncertainty, how 7 
decisions change under time pressure, and how choice context changes preferences. 8 
DFT fits in a general class of sequential sampling models. DFT has multiple 9 
parameters but the threshold parameter is the best choice to explain the shifts to game 10 
management we describe as a decision to shift after a threshold is met. The basic idea 11 
underlying the decision process is illustrated in Fig. 1 and refers to three prototypical 12 
situations a referee may experience as documented in the analyses of referee 13 
performance and self-reports (Cunningham et al., 2014; Pina et al., 2019; Slack et al., 14 
2011). We acknowledge there can be a large number of response choices in every 15 
refereeing situation, but illustrate with a simple example. Suppose the decision maker 16 
is initially presented with a choice between three risky prospects, A, B, and C, at time 17 
t = 0. Each trajectory in the figure represents the preference state for one of the 18 
alternatives at each moment in time.  19 
 20 
***Insert Fig. 1 near here*** 21 
 22 
At each moment in time, the decision maker thinks about various payoffs of 23 
each prospect, which produces an affective reaction, or valence, to each prospect. 24 
These valences are integrated across time to produce the preference state at each 25 
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moment. During the stages of processing, attention can shift towards advantages 1 
favoring one prospect over the other. The stopping rule for this process of comparing 2 
payoffs and assessing preferences is controlled by a threshold: the first prospect to 3 
reach the top threshold is accepted. Choice probability is determined by the first 4 
option to win the race and cross the upper threshold, and decision time is equal to the 5 
deliberation time required by one of the prospects to reach this threshold.  6 
The threshold is an important parameter for controlling speed-accuracy 7 
tradeoffs. High thresholds require a strong preference state to determine the decision, 8 
which allows for more sampling of information about the prospects, extending the 9 
deliberation process, and thus increasing accuracy. It follows, then, that low 10 
thresholds require a weaker preference state and less sampling of information about 11 
the prospects, thus shortening the time taken to deliberate processing, but also 12 
decreasing the likelihood of choices accuracy. Under high time pressure, decision 13 
makers must choose a low threshold, while under low time pressure a higher threshold 14 
can be used to increase accuracy. Thus, decisions can be driven by time pressure, with 15 
reversed choices depending on the amount of time available.  16 
A very important feature of the concept of thresholds is that it allows 17 
individual differences that describe high or low thresholds (inter-individual 18 
differences), as well as different thresholds in different contexts (intra-individual 19 
differences). Our predictions are based on the tenets of DFT, assuming a threshold 20 
model with two thresholds of game management (High/Low) and each choice (foul/no 21 
foul) as getting closer to one of these thresholds. The model suggests that referees 22 
hold a threshold for applying game management: if game dynamics allows more strict 23 
application of the rules, then the referee is under threshold of applying game 24 
management. However, as soon as a subjective threshold is met, referees apply game 25 
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management to either let the game flow (and thus be looser in applying the rules and 1 
not calling), or if aggression starts – make a call earlier (using preventive refereeing 2 
and more conversation, or an earlier foul call). Thus, our model provides predictions, 3 
for example, when the events in a game mean that it has hit a subjective threshold of 4 
becoming rougher, then the referee changes from applying the rules to managing the 5 
game by verbalizing to the fouling players and calling minor fouls earlier. Thresholds 6 
can be for instance set between to maximum 1 indicating potentially zero switches to 7 
game management to 0 indicating for every change in context a shift to game 8 
management. Most likely real data showing extreme cases of 13 yellow cards or zero 9 
yellow cards in increasing aggression games are the boundary condition of threshold 10 
distribution in real games. Threshold can as well vary over time, can have a slope or 11 
non-linear curvatures but for simplicity we assume a simple model. Below we will 12 
illustrate the details of accurate and adequate decisions based on existing findings and 13 
theoretical perspectives that all share the same gap in explaining how referees shift 14 
between accurate and adequate choices. 15 
How does the model account for context? 16 
We will describe three possible decision processes across the game's timeline, 17 
referring mostly to those ambiguous contact situations where decisions are not clear- 18 
cut: 19 
Situation A – the game is played more or less with limited aggression (i.e., assertive, 20 
flat game; see Fig. 2). Each referee is likely to whistle according to his/her threshold 21 
level. The different thresholds and decision behaviors can be explained by individual 22 
differences in personality traits, accumulated experiences and preferences (e.g., 23 
Arslanoğlu, Doğan, & Acar, 2018; Guillén & Feltz, 2011; Werger, 2017). Under an 24 
assertive scenario the referees, R1 and R2, would apply the rules as is, because they 25 
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are both under their threshold of applying game management. Context is overlooked, 1 
and thus accuracy is increased. In terms of implications when assessing a referee, we 2 
argue that fewer mistakes in application of the laws are acceptable for this sort of 3 
game, as we would expect more law enforcement. Thus, factors such as the level of 4 
the game being played, which may be critical in other ways of conceptualizing 5 
decision processes in refereeing, are less critical factors for thresholds for game 6 
management than the level of aggression or the severity of the actions from a safety 7 
perspective.  8 
It should be emphasized that situation A does not really pose a challenge, as 9 
this may be a rare scenario. Nevertheless, a great deal of work that looks at referees' 10 
decision making assumes this lack of variation, although previous evidence from 11 
game analysis (e.g., Bar-Eli, Tenenbaum, & Geister, 2006; Kirker, Tenenbaum, & 12 
Mattson, 2000) shows that most games are not flat and unvaried. 13 
 14 
***Insert Fig. 2 near here*** 15 
 16 
Situation B – the level of aggression fluctuates throughout the game. This is 17 
the situation that is most typical of most ball sports (Kavussanu & Tenenbaum, 2014; 18 
Russell, 2008), and thus most critical for any model attempting to predict and explain 19 
behaviors. Let us assume that the game starts with a low level of violence. This would 20 
allow the referees, R1 and R2, to apply the rules because they are both under their 21 
threshold of applying game management. In time t1 the level of aggression in the 22 
game increases. If a subjective threshold is met, the referee calls a foul or penalty. The 23 
referees in our model pay attention to the history of the game when evaluating each 24 
event. Thus, the accuracy and adequacy of decisions is influenced by each referee's 25 
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threshold, and depends on the specific situation/circumstances at the time that the 1 
offense occurs (i.e., what is fair and better for the flow of the game).  2 
Situation C – the game is characterized by a constant high level of aggression, 3 
with little fluctuations. According to Unkelbach and Memmert (2008), soccer referees 4 
call relatively fewer fouls at the early phase of the game, because they have to 5 
calibrate their judgment scale and develop a "feeling for the game" (Brand & Neß, 6 
2004). Then, for the rest of the game referees decide whether to whistle or not and 7 
how severely to punish a fouling player or team according to the game's context. 8 
Based on this approach to explaining decision choices, the major principle guiding the 9 
referees' judgments would be staying consistent with previous decisions in the game. 10 
For example, a referee does not call a foul for one of the teams. Later in the game, if 11 
the other team commits a similar offense, then he/she would most likely decide not to 12 
call a foul in order to maintain consistency, regardless of the context in which the 13 
offense occurs. 14 
Relating this to our argument, we expect that a referee with a low game 15 
management threshold (R2 – game manager referee), who shifts to a game 16 
management decision control process earlier, would call fewer fouls (e.g., less yellow 17 
cards) under possible foul situations in order to stay consistent with his/her previous 18 
decisions (a game management behavior). The referee with a higher threshold for 19 
game management (R1 – law enforcement referee) would call more fouls if called a 20 
foul early. Thus, the level of accuracy and adequacy in referees' decisions would be 21 
influenced by the major principle of consistency.  22 
 23 
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With what follows, we underline the strengths of the threshold model over the 1 
current existing models in explaining and predicting the in-game referees' decisions 2 
and actions. 3 
How does the model account for individual differences? 4 
Inter-individual differences 5 
The threshold model assumes that the value for an option at a certain time is 6 
determined by the perception of how best that option fits (foul without a yellow card), 7 
relative to another option (foul with yellow card) on the single attribute (e.g., bodily 8 
contact of the players) under consideration. For simplification, it is illustrated only for 9 
two options and one attribute but the model can be extended to multiple options and 10 
multiple attribute scenarios (Diederich & Turblond, 2018). This momentary valence is 11 
added to a modified trace of the previous preference state (e.g., given the general 12 
tendency to award more or fewer yellow cards), resulting in a vector P(t) of 13 
preferences for each alternative at each time. An alternative is chosen when the 14 
preference for that alternative exceeds some threshold value, denoted θ, that the 15 
individual considers ‘sufficient’ for making a decision. Let us assume we have 16 
information about the person's preference for intuitive and deliberative processing 17 
when making decisions. The knowledge of the preference for intuitive decisions as 18 
one of many potential variables to assess a threshold would allow us to individually 19 
set a threshold in DFT. The information about the preference for intuitive decisions 20 
could be assessed using the Preference for Intuition and Deliberation Scale (PID; 21 
Betsch, 2004). It provides questions for the subscale such as "I listen carefully to my 22 
deepest feelings" (Intuition) or "When I have a problem I first analyze the facts and 23 
details before I decide" (Deliberation). The scales allow categorization of people as 24 
high in Preference for Intuition, high in Deliberation or situation-specific high or low 25 
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on both scales. The PID scores could be used to transform PID Questionnaire 1 
individual differences to Parameter Values of our threshold model. The linear 2 
transformations from PID to our threshold parameter could be performed using the 3 
Equation:  4 
Threshold, θ = (36 – PID)/36    5 
For example, the two most extreme individuals (in terms of PID score for 6 
intuition and thus may consider more game management information taken into 7 
account for making a decision) could be characterized by the following parameters of 8 
θ = .5 (if a person scores 18 points for PID in favor of intuition resulting in a 9 
calculation of ((36-18)/36) for a lower threshold, and θ = 1 ((36-0)/36) for a threshold 10 
twice as high, for a relatively deliberative decision maker. The dependent variable to  11 
measure a choice (e.g., to call a foul or not) may use the current context of the 12 
situation as indicated in our model. Interindividual differences of referees may predict 13 
who will use additional information based on a PID score. Also, sensitivity analyses 14 
(further predictions generated from around the parameter space) allow us to show if 15 
the parameter range affects the results and thus to test the threshold model. A default 16 
value to be specified from the data of a sample for θ reflects the mean of the 17 
distribution of PID-transformed variables. The distribution of θ is based on the 18 
transformation. Finally, the time step parameter (h) was set to 0.01 to closely 19 
approximate a continuous (rather than discrete) deliberation process given the time 20 
and potential processing underlying dynamic situations such as a foul in soccer. The 21 
model would produce a probability for each option (e.g., p(foul/yellow) = .27, 22 
p(foul/no yellow) = .73) given the threshold parameter used from the PID 23 
transformation. These values can be compared with referees' real behavior for 24 
validation and model fit (see Raab & Johnson, 2004 for a demonstration in athletes' 25 
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decision making based on their questionnaire values as action- or state-orientation). 1 
The model can as also be individualized or use mean values for a group of people and 2 
can be cross-validated to new samples. Outputs can be deterministic or probabilistic 3 
depending on the question at hand (see Glöckner et al., 2012 for different kinds of 4 
models and validation processes using gaze data to predict choices by athletes). In the 5 
case of inter-individual differences the model simply assumes a flat game in which the 6 
threshold is stable and is driven by the individuals' baseline threshold for given fouls 7 
and yellow cards. Let us now assume a situation in which intra-individual differences 8 
need to be explained under varying thresholds given changes of the situation. 9 
Intra-individual differences 10 
In Fig. 2 we describe situations of changing context that require game 11 
management. We assume that the threshold parameter is adapted given the current 12 
context. For example, if an individual with a threshold of .5 (see above section, where 13 
this is based on the PID score) now detects the need for game management by 14 
providing more verbal warnings or fouls, the threshold would be reduced by some 15 
incremental points (for modeling purposes maybe in steps of .1, depending on the 16 
distance between the context n-1 and now). If the change in the game allows for less 17 
game management and more rule application, the threshold will increase to .6 or 18 
higher. Given the threshold change over time and the current context violations of 19 
consistency, changes of choice probabilities for one or the other option will be 20 
modeled based on context changes. Again, validation of the model can be achieved by 21 
contrasting a model fit of simulated behavior with real referees' behavior.  22 
If we want to account for the combined effects of intra-individual and context 23 
effect in referees' choices, we consider both the starting threshold for awarding 24 
penalties and the given current context. Russell, Renshaw and Davids (2018) support 25 
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the idea that a game is co-created by the interactions of players and officials. For 1 
example, a referee's excessive use of yellow cards may change the context and 2 
threshold. In response, player behavior continues to change the context, reinforcing 3 
and even lowering the threshold.  4 
Comparison of the proposed model to existing ones 5 
 Any model of decision making that considers the referee's challenge about 6 
when to use game management and when to use rule administration needs to account 7 
for the research aimed at understanding influences on both accurate (rule 8 
administration) and adequate (game management) decisions. Therefore, in Table 1 we 9 
review what the research tells us about referees' decision making based on accuracy 10 
and based on adequacy. Fiedler and Bless (2000) is the framework on which much of 11 
the research on accuracy is based. This framework looks at components of the 12 
decision-making process (see Fig. 3). The multiple cue usage approach similarly 13 
examines where errors can be avoided in training (Plessner et al., 2009). In contrast, 14 
consistency is the emphasis in the calibration work (e.g., Memmert et al., 2008). What 15 
all of these perspectives do not help explain, however, is the switch within the 16 
referee's dilemma between adequate and accurate decision making. 17 
 18 
***Insert Table 1 near here*** 19 
***Insert Fig. 3 near here*** 20 
 21 
Designs of experiments to test the model  22 
In order to test the threshold model we propose the following design: A two- 23 
factorial design, with groups of referees reflecting inter-individual differences (R1 and 24 
R2 grouped by PID) x 3 game contexts that may produce different intra-individual 25 
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choices (flat-no aggression, high aggression-constant, high/low aggression -fluctuate). 1 
The task would be a classical video test as used in several studies referenced in Table 2 
1: Video-based decisions in ambiguous situations (in soccer) with occlusion points at 3 
which the referees (as participants) indicate their decision (e.g., warnings, foul, yellow 4 
cards, red cards, check in video-replay, communicate with players, communicate with 5 
assistant referees). Our hypotheses predict main effects for inter-individual 6 
differences. R2 (game manager referee) with a high preference for intuition and lower 7 
threshold could include more game management as compared to R1 (law enforcer 8 
referee; high on preference for deliberation) over all situations. Further, we predict 9 
main effects for game contexts. Specifically, in Situation A with no aggression, both 10 
referees will show consistent and few sanctions and low levels of communication. In 11 
situation B, with varying aggression and a generally changing context, we would 12 
expect more communication and sanctions that are less consistent with previous calls. 13 
In addition, we assume an interaction of both factors: interindividual differences and 14 
context. This would mean that in Situation B, with variable aggression levels, a 15 
referee with a high threshold for switching to game management would make a switch 16 
later in a game that has increased in aggression, compared to the referee with a lower 17 
threshold. Finally, in situation C, given the high and constant level of aggression, 18 
communication and sanctions would systematically go up.  19 
Cross-validation of our model as a computational model would use the 20 
threshold parameters derived from individual differences (as explained above in 21 
transforming self-reports in model-parameters, e.g., PID score) to predict the choice 22 
distribution in the next game. We would use previous exercises of modeling sport 23 
choices (e.g., Johnson, 2006; Raab & Johnson, 2004). 24 
Running head: A threshold process model of refereeing 
 24 
Conclusions and future directions 1 
We conclude that the threshold model informs the field by proposing a process 2 
of how referees switch between accurate and adequate choices (rule administration vs. 3 
game management). Previous models, in contrast, have merely described the 4 
challenge or focused on one side to explain either accurate or adequate choices. Our 5 
model can be empirically tested against alternative models and be used for 6 
computational modeling to predict choices. Whether the value of the model is based 7 
on its explained variance is an empirical question, however we do see direct 8 
implications for training if our model holds. For instance, typical training and 9 
evaluation of referee performance should not purely focus on accurate decisions. 10 
Instead performance measures should include when a referee used game management 11 
and whether violation of rule application was appropriate. Given the importance of 12 
game management for making accurate and adequate decisions, as well as the 13 
importance of other dimensions of game management (Slack et al., 2013), we propose 14 
that referee selection and referee training can be evaluated in a more holistic manner.  15 
First, we propose that the use of individual video game clips to train decision 16 
making should also include context of the game to show sequences of decisions 17 
including the sequentially previously made choices. Knowing about thresholds of 18 
individual referees and potential indicators of those thresholds may help to 19 
personalize the training and decisions of referees, catering to individual needs.  20 
Second, and more generally, we propose that for a good professional (as in 21 
other domains such as a good doctor, lawyer) training and education sets the base for 22 
good choices but context-specific experience will foster the enforcement of rules 23 
through game management. 24 
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Referees should thus be evaluated on both their accuracy and game 1 
management. The threshold model will have its limits in explaining behavior because 2 
referees cannot be trained to zero errors. However, this is precisely why the choices of 3 
referees are an exciting part of the game, to which science can contribute some key 4 
understanding.  5 
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